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After almost twenty years’ experience with flexible exchange rates, many ob- 
servers have begun to look back nostalgically at the Bretton Woods period of 
fixed  exchange  rates.  The exchange  rate  stability offered by  the  Bretton 
Woods system of  fixed rates helped facilitate investment and trade decisions 
by reducing one potentially important source of risk. In the period since ex- 
change rates became flexible in  1973, this stability has been replaced by  a 
high degree of short-term volatility like that found in commodity or equity 
markets. Unhedged positions in any particular currency have resulted in un- 
anticipated gains and losses that far exceed those experienced under Bretton 
Woods.’ So, as a result, foreign exchange risk premiums have developed to 
compensate investors for positions in particular currencies. Some observers 
point to such risk premiums (although they are difficult to measure) as evi- 
dence of the costs imposed by flexible rates. 
Experience under Bretton Woods, however, suggests that there are also 
costs associated with fixed exchange rates. The price paid for stable exchange 
rates under Bretton Woods was a degree of control over international financial 
transactions that might be regarded as onerous in today’s environment of de- 
regulated markets  .* The extensive capital controls that  inhibited flows be- 
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1. McKinnon (1988) presents the case against flexible rates. He argues that many business risks 
associated with flexible rates cannot be hedged because of the lack of contingent forward markets 
in goods and services. 
2. Giovannini (1988) presents evidence that restrictions on capital flows have been an important 
feature of three fixed exchange rate regimes: the gold standard (at least in times of crisis), Bretton 
Woods, and the European Monetary System. Eichengreen (1989), however, shows that the period 
of fixed exchange rates between the world wars was notably free of capital controls. 
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tween most national financial markets led to sizable interest differentials that 
distorted international financial decisions. This paper will compare the inte- 
gration of short-term financial markets under Bretton Woods with the integra- 
tion of these same financial markets under flexible exchange rates. 
Exchange rates naturally became more volatile after the breakdown of Bret- 
ton Woods in 197  1. Table 1  1.1 compares the volatility of changes in exchange 
rates in the Bretton Woods and flexible rate periods. The changes in exchange 
rates are measured over three-month holding periods corresponding to the ma- 
turity of the interest rates to be studied below. The calculations for the Bretton 
Woods period begin whenever Eurocurrency rates first became available for 
that currency and end in January  1971.3 The table shows that the standard 
errors of the exchange rate changes are from two to fifteen times larger under 
flexible rates than under fixed rates. Notice, however, that two of the exchange 
rates, for the dollar/pound and the deutsche markldollar, have sizable standard 
errors even in the Bretton Woods period. This is because both currencies were 
realigned prior to 197  1  . 
The clear division between the Bretton Woods period and the flexible rate 
period does not hold as well for other financial variables. In the case of interest 
rates, in particular, the exchange rate regime may not be as important to be- 
havior as the presence or absence of  capital controls. Consider table  1  1.2, 
which reports on the standard deviations and correlations of three sets of Eu- 
rocurrency and national interest rates.4 The interest rates for all three curren- 
cies in table 1  1.2 have somewhat higher volatility in the flexible rate period. 
But the most telling difference in behavior lies in the correlations between 
Eurocurrency and national interest rates. In the absence of controls, these cor- 
relations are over  .99, indicating a high  degree of  integration between the 
national and the Eurocurrency markets.  But  the correlations are distinctly 
lower when controls on the national markets are in effect, whether or not ex- 
change rates are flexible. The paper will try to disentangle the effects of capi- 
tal controls and exchange rate volatility. 
The shift to flexible exchange rates in  1973 has stimulated numerous stud- 
ies of  international financial linkages. Many of these studies have examined 
the degree of  integration between short-term financial markets through tests 
of  uncovered interest parity or related conditions  .5  Almost invariably, these 
tests have been based on Eurocurrency interest rates rather than national inter- 
est rates because the former are free of capital controls. So tests of uncovered 
interest parity have provided evidence about foreign exchange risk premiums 
rather than political barriers to the international integration of financial mar- 
3. The Bretton Woods system collapsed in May  1971, so changes in exchange rates defined 
over three-month holding periods  must end in January  1971. The five currencies represented in 
table 11.1 are the only ones that have Eurocurrency rates available from the early 1960s. 
4. These three sets of interest rates will be studied in detail in the next section. 
5. Hodrick (1987) presents a critical survey of these empirical studies. Other references are 
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Table 11.1  Volatility of Changes  in Exchange Rates: Standard Errors of 
Percentage Changes (in %/annun) 
$/€ Rate,  DM/$ Rate,  DA/$  Rate,  SF/$ Rate, 
196  l(4)-1989(7)  1963(  1)-1989(7)  1962(  1)-1989(7)  1963(  1  )-1989(7) 
Bretton Woods period (to 1971[11): 
No. of obs.  118  97  109  97 
Sample mean  -  1.46  -1.19  -  .05  -  .08 
Sample SE  4.57  2.64  .76  .80 
Flexible rate period (1973[1]-1989[7]): 
No. of  obs.  199  199  199  199 
Sample mean  -  2.60  -2.68  -2.04  -4.26 
Sample SE  11.89  12.67  12.41  14.02 
Sources: For the dollar/pound rate, Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin: for other spot rates, 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Sfatistics. 
Note: The percentage changes in exchange rates have been calculated over three-month holding 
periods (since all interest rates used in the study are for three-month maturities), then annualized. 
kets. No studies have tried to compare the relative effect of  capital controls 
and exchange risk on interest differentials. Few studies, moreover, have com- 
pared interest differentials among the major financial markets under fixed and 
flexible exchange rates.  In fact, most studies begin their sample periods in 
1973 or later because financial data are so much more readily available for the 
more recent period. 
This study will examine both Eurocurrency and national financial markets 
over periods beginning in the early 1960s. It will encompass markets in five 
currencies-the  dollar, guilder, mark,  sterling, and Swiss franc. It will ex- 
amine the effects of capital controls and political risk on interest differentials 
between Eurocurrency and national markets and the effects of  foreign ex- 
change risk premiums on Eurocurrency differentials. 
11.1  Capital Controls and Political Risk 
One of the alleged benefits of  flexible exchange rates is that they free na- 
tional monetary authorities from balance of  payments constraints and thus 
permit them to relax capital controls. This section will investigate how  the 
breakdown of  Bretton Woods led to the removal of controls in several of the 
major financial markets. This will be done by comparing covered interest dif- 
ferentials in the 1960s with those in later periods. 
Covered interest differentials can arise for any of three reasons. First, the 
securities being considered may differ in default risk.6 Second, the markets 
6. Government securities, for example, are generally regarded as less subject to default risk 
than private assets. Assets may also differ in tax status and eligibility for discounting at the central 
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Table 11.2  Volatility of Exchange Rates and Interest Rates: Standard Errors (in 
%/annum) and Correlation Coefficients 
SE  SE  SE British  Correlation 
$If.  Rate  Interest Rate  Rate  Interest Rates 
% Change  Euro-E  Interest  between 
Pound sterling: 
Bretton Woods with 
controls (1961[4]- 
197  1  [  11) 
controls (1973[1]- 
1979[6]) 
Flexible rates without 
controls (1979[7]- 
1989[7]) 
Flexible rates with 
4.57  1.43  .77  398 
10.42  1.62  1.26 
12.78  1.26  1.26 
SE  SE  SE German 
% Change  Euro-DM  Interest 









(  1974[2]-1989[7]) 
3.52  .94  .92 
11.89  1.39  1.50 
11.94  1.25  1.29 
SE  SE U.S. 
Euro-$  Interest 







(1  966[ 11-1 973[ 121) 
(1974[1]-1989[7]) 
.67  .92  ,778 
1.55  1.70  ,993 
Sources: For exchange rates, see table 11.1; for interest rates, see later tables. 
may  be segmented by  capital controls. Finally, even if  no  capital controls 
separate the markets, investors may perceive a political or sovereign risk in- 
volving future restrictions.’ In the interest rate comparisons below, I will at- 
tempt to confine comparisons to securities with equal default risk, although, 
as will be evident, that is not entirely possible. So covered interest differen- 
7. Political or sovereign risk arises because of  concern that the national authorities of one coun- 
try might impose controls, taxes, or other regulatory measures on foreign investment in their 
market or on their residents’ investments in other markets. 519  Interest Differentials under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates 
tials will primarily reflect the joint influence of capital controls and political 
risk, which I term the country premium.8 
Capital controls come in two varieties. Governments may restrict resident 
purchases of  foreign assets (and sometimes nonresident outflows as well). 
Such ourward controls, which are usually designed to prop up a weak cur- 
rency, lead to a covered interest differential favoring the foreign market unless 
there is sufficient flexibility in the controls to permit arbitrage between domes- 
tic and foreign markets. Alternatively,.  governments may restrict nonresident 
purchases of domestic assets in order to reduce pressures toward appreciation 
of the domestic currency. Such inward controls may lead to an interest differ- 
ential favoring the domestic market. Only a few countries like Germany and 
Switzerland  have resorted to such inward controls. 
1  1.1.1  British Controls 
To  examine how controls affect markets, consider the case of  the British 
market. The British government maintained a system of controls on resident 
outflows until as late as June 1979. The controls applied primarily to direct 
and portfolio investment abroad by  U.K.  residents, the holding of  foreign 
currency deposits by  residents, and foreign currency lending by  residents, 
including U.K. banks.9 Residents could invest abroad only by using foreign 
exchange obtained from the sale of existing securities or from foreign cur- 
rency borrowing.1° These controls, which were a holdover from the wartime 
period, did not prevent London from maintaining its preeminence as a finan- 
cial center because the Bank of England was farsighted enough to allow the 
Eurocurrency market to develop in London outside the system of  controls. 
Banks in London could accept deposits and make loans denominated in any 
currency except sterling. Of  course, the controls restricted investments by 
residents in Eurocurrency deposits just like they restricted residents’ invest- 
ments in markets outside the United Kingdom. The controls also prohibited 
Eurosterling deposits and loans from being offered by banks located in Lon- 
don, although a Eurosterling market developed in Paris. 
The Eurocurrency market itself operated free of any capital controls. Thus, 
host governments (such as the British government in the case of Eurocurrency 
transactions in London) permitted bank transactions involving foreign curren- 
cies by  nonresidents even when  they restricted transactions involving their 
own currencies. In addition, political risks were perceived to be of negligible 
8. For previous treatments of capital controls and political risk and their implications for cov- 
ered interest parity, see Aliber (1973), Dooley and Isard (1980), Frenkel and Levich (1975). and 
Marston (1976). Frankel and MacArthur (1988) also use the term countrypremium in their study 
of covered interest differentials over the period 1982-86. 
9. Artis and Taylor (1989) describe these capital controls in more detail. 
10. An investment dollar market grew up with a premium over the official exchange rate reflect- 
ing the tightness of the controls. 520  Richard C. Marston 
importance in this market. Consider the comparison between Eurodollar and 
Euromark deposits in London. Investors might perceive that both forms of 
Eurocurrency deposits were subject to some political risk, although that risk 
would be low since the British authorities were unlikely to tamper with a mar- 
ket that could be moved elsewhere so easily. But, even if  all Eurocurrency 
deposits were at some risk, there was little reason to believe that the risk was 
greater for one type of Eurocurrency deposit relative to another type. That is 
because the British government (or any other government) was  unlikely to 
discriminate among foreign currencies in any extension of controls to the Eu- 
rocurrency market. So it was not surprising that covered interestparity always 
held between any pair of Eurocurrency deposit rates. 
Consider  the  comparison  between  Eurodollar  and  Eurosterling interest 
rates. If the Eurodollar interest rate is adjusted for the cost of forward cover, 
then the two returns expressed in sterling should be equal: 
(1)  COVERED INTEREST PARITY:  if,  = i,,  -k fQ, 
where i,,  = In  (1 + f,J  (where I,,  is the Eurodollar interest rate),  i,  = In 
(1 + ffI)  (where If,  is the Eurosterling rate), andf,  = In  (F,/S,)  (where F, is 
the forward exchange rate, and S, is the spot exchange rate, both expressed in 
pounds/dollars). The two returns should be identical except for transactions 
costs. 
In the case of comparisons involving the British interest rate (&,),  in con- 
trast, a covered differential could reflect a country premium resulting from 
capital controls or political risks associated with  the British market. Since 
covered interest parity always holds for the Eurocurrency markets, we may 
measure the deviation of  British rates from covered interest parity  in two 
ways-using  the Eurodollar rate and the forward premium or the Eurosterling 
rate alone: 
The first equation measures U,,,  the deviation between the covered Eurodollar 
rate and the British interest rate. The second equation measures U,, the devia- 
tion between the Eurosterling rate and the British interest rate. Since British 
capital controls limited outflows  of capital, we would expect both deviations 
to be positive (or equal to zero when the control is not binding). 
Table 11.3 reports monthly interest differentials for the sterling markets for 
the period from April  1961, when Eurosterling interest rates were first re- 
ported by the Bank of England, to June 1979, when British capital controls 
ended. The underlying data are published in the Bank of England's Quarterly 
Bulletin. The interest rates reported are for three-month maturities expressed 
in percentage per annum, so the differentials are calculated in logs as follows 
(for the case of the Eurodollar and British interest rates): 521  Interest Differentials under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates 
Table 11.3  Covered Interest Differentials  in the Dollar/Pound Markets 
(in %/amurn, 1%1[4]-1979[6]) 
Euro-$/British  Euro-€/British  Euro-$/Euro-f 
No. of obs.  219  219  219 
Sample mean  1.12  1.04  .08 
SE of mean  .I8  .!7  .02 
t-statistic  6.35*  6.17*  3.04* 
Band for 95% of obs.  4.23  3.78  .38 
Source: Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin (various issues) 
Note: The standard errors of the mean are calculated as if there were N/3  observations. The means 
marked with an asterisk (*) are statistically different from zero at the  5%  level. The British 
interest rate is the three-month local authority deposit rate through 1971 and the sterling interbank 
deposit rate thereafter. 
(2a')  {In [l + (Z,,/400)]  + In  (F,/S,)  - In  [l + (ZBr/400)]}  x  400. 
The forward and spot exchange rates are expressed in pounds/dollars after 
having been inverted to conform with practices in other exchange markets. 
The table reports differentials between Eurodollar and British rates, between 
Eurosterling and British rates, and between Eurodollar and Eurosterling rates. 
The first and last differentials are calculated using the forward premium on the 
pound, while the second differential omits the forward premium because both 
interest rates are expressed in sterling. 
Table  11.3 illustrates  how  effective  capital  controls can  be  in  driving 
wedges between national and Eurocurrency interest rates. According to this 
table,  interest differentials between the British market  and either Eurocur- 
rency market averaged over 1% per annum during the period of the controls. 
The standard errors of the sample means of these differentials were less than 
0.20%, so both these means are statistically different from zero at the 5% 
level."  In the absence of controls, differentials of this size would induce im- 
mediate arbitrage activity by bank traders. The fifth row of the table reports 
the band for interest rate differentials within which 95% of the observations 
fail.'* That band includes differentials as large as 4.23% in the case of  com- 
parisons between Eurodollar and British rates and 3.78% in comparisons be- 
tween Eurosterling and British rates. These differentials were large enough to 
provide firms within the British market with substantial advantages over firms 
with access only to international markets. During the period of the controls, 
therefore, multinational firms with operations in Britain as well as elsewhere 
11. Since the monthly observations of three-month interest differentials overlap, the standard 
errors of the means are. calculated as if there are only N/3  observations. Frankel and MacArthur 
(1988) make a similar adjustment for the three-month rates in their study. 
12. This statistic gives some indication of how distortionary the controls are when they are most 
binding. 522  Richard C. Marston 
found it advantageous to finance as much as possible behind the British con- 
trol barrier. Rather than being a high-cost center, the British sterling market 
offered financing at lower rates, when measured in dollars, than did markets 
with seemingly low interest rates such as Germany. 
The table also shows covered differentials between the Eurodollar and the 
Eurosterling markets. The differentials averaged only 0.08% per annum over 
the period of  the capital controls. Although 0.08% is statistically different 
from zero, it is not economically significant since transactions costs are most 
likely large enough to eliminate any profits from arbitrage activity.13  Some of 
the observed differentials were several times as large as 0.08%  since the 95% 
band included differentials as large as 0.38%. But that is more likely to reflect 
imperfections in the data rather than genuine arbitrage opportunities open to 
bank traders. In studying the 1960s and  1970s, researchers have to contend 
with poorer data than are available today. In the case of the British market, the 
data-coming  from one source, the Bank of England-are  of relatively high 
quality. But the Bank of England data are not all synchronous since the Paris 
market, where the Eurosterling quotes originate, closes one hour later than the 
London market, where the Eurodollar and exchange rate quotes originate. So 
the few large differentials observed between the two markets are probably due 
to interest rate movements in Paris in the last hour of trading. 
To study the effect of controls in greater detail, I break up the sample period 
into  three  subperiods: (a) the  last  decade  of  the  Bretton  Woods  period, 
1961(4)-1971(4);14  (b) a period of flexible exchange rates when capital con- 
trols were  still in  place,  1973(1)-1979(6); and  (c) the postcontrol  period, 
1979(7)-1989(7).  For each period, I study the differentials between the Euros- 
terling and the British interest rates. 
Table  11.4 reports the sample means of  the interest differentials between 
the two markets, the standard errors of these means and their t-statistics, and 
the band within which 95% of the observations lie. To  show the asymmetric 
nature of the controls, which inhibited outward flows but not inward flows, I 
report separate statistics for the positive differentials of the Eurosterling rate 
over the British interest rate. If the controls are asymmetric, the differentials 
should be  predominantly positive,  especially the  large differentials found 
when the controls are most binding. 
In the two periods when the British market was subject to controls, the 
interest differentials were quite substantial. During the Bretton Woods period, 
the differential averaged 0.78%  with the 95% band occurring at a differential 
13. The recent study by Clinton (1988) used bid-ask spreads to  measure transactions costs 
associated with covered interest transactions. He estimated that transactions costs were as low as 
0.06%  for a six-month period in  1985-86.  Whether transactions costs were that  low over the 
entire twenty-nine-year  period is difficult to say in the absence of better data. 
14. The effective end of Bretton Woods is assumed to have occurred in May  1971, when the 
mark and guilder began a period of floating and when the Swiss franc was revalued. There was an 
attempt to reestablish fixed parities in the Smithsonian Agreement reached in December 197 1, but 
the new parities could not be sustained. 523  Interest Differentials under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates 
Table 11.4  Interest Differentials between the Eurosterling and British Markets 
(in %/annum, 1961[4]-1989[7]) 
Bretton Woods  Flexible Rates  Flexible Rates 
Period,  with Controls,  without Controls, 
1961(4)-1971(4)  1973(  1)-1979(6)  1979(7)-1989(7) 
No. of obs.  121  78  121 
Sample mean 
SE of mean 
t-statistic 
.78  1.50  -  .03 
.25  .25  .02 
3.17*  5.94*  -  1.05 
Band for 95% of  obs.  4.14  3.78  .36 
Positive obs. 
% of obs. 
Sample mean 
72.7  93.6  52.9 
1.15  1.61  .06 
Source: Bank of  England, Quarterly Bulletin (various issues) 
Note; See the note to table 11.3. 
as large as 4.14%. In the flexible period, the average differential was even 
larger at 1.50%. In this latter period, 93.6% of the differentials were positive. 
In both periods, the mean differentials are statistically different from zero at 
the 5% level. 
Once  the  controls  were  removed  in  1979, the  differential  dropped  to 
-  0.03% with only 52.9% of the differentials being positive. Figure 11.1 il- 
lustrates how  dramatically different were the differentials in the postcontrol 
period. This figure shows the differential between the Eurosterling rate and 
the British interbank rate during the flexible rate period. A vertical line indi- 
cates when the controls were removed. Both table 11.4 and figure 11.1 show 
clearly that the controls had  a very substantial effect on interest differentials 
and, therefore, on the relative costs of  financing in the British and external 
markets. 
1  1.1.2  German Controls 
As in the British case, the German government resorted to capital controls 
in an attempt to shield the domestic financial markets from international pres- 
sures. But German controls were designed to limit inflows rather than out- 
flows of  funds. 
In the late  1960s, the mark came under attack periodically because of  a 
widespread belief that it was undervalued relative to the dollar and other major 
currencies. In October  1969, the German authorities revalued the mark by 
8.5%. But, when the pressure on the mark resumed in  1970, the authorities 
began to impose capital controls inhibiting inflows from abroad in an attempt 
to limit further appreciation of  the mark. The controls eventually included 
bans on interest payments to foreigners, the imposition of  cash deposits on 524  Richard C. Marston 
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Fig. 11.1 
1973( 1)-1989(7) 
Source; Bank of  England, Qunrferly Bulletin 
Eurosterlinghitish Interest Differentials, Flexible Rate Period, 
borrowings abroad (initially 40%), restrictions on the purchase of  domestic 
bonds  by  nonresidents,  and,  finally,  general  restrictions  on  borrowing 
abroad.I5  The controls resulted in a negative gap between interest rates in the 
Euromark market and the German market. The move to flexible exchange 
rates in early 1973 reduced the incentives to invest in the German market, but 
it was not until February 1974 that the authorities began to remove the net- 
work of capital controls. 
Table 11.5 reports evidence on the differential between the Euromark and 
the German interbank rates for the period from 1966 to 1989. The sample is 
broken up into three periods: (a)  the Bretton Woods period prior to the impo- 
sition of controls, 1966(  1)-1970(3);  (b) the control period, 1970(4)-1974(  1); 
and (c) the postcontrol period, 1974(2)-1989(  10). The control period includes 
about a year when the deutsche marWdollar rate was still fixed as well as three 
years when this rate was allowed to vary (at least periodically). 
It is evident from the table that the precontrol Bretton Woods period re- 
sembles the postcontrol period much more than the period of  controls. The 
differential averages -  0.40% during the precontrol period and -  0.23% dur- 
ing the postcontrol period but -  2.97% during the period of contro1s.l6  Simi- 
15. The controls are described in Deutsche Bundesbank (1985) and Dooley and Isard (1980). 
16. The sample means are statistically different from zero in all three periods. In the two non- 
control periods, however, the means are much smaller, although probably not small enough to be 
explained by  transactions costs. The differentials may be attributable to differences in the risk 525  Interest Differentials under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates 
Table 11.5  Interest Differentials between Euromark and German Markets 
(in %/annum,  1966[1]-1989[7]) 
Precontrol 
(Bretton Woods) 
Period,  Flexible Rates 
1966(  1)-  Control Period,  without Controls, 
1970(3)  1970(4)-1974(  I)  (1974(2)-1989(7) 
No. of obs.  51  46  186 
Sample mean  -  .40  -  2.97  -  .23 
SE of mean  .14  .67  .03 
?-statistic  -2.94*  -  4.42*  -  6.70* 




82.4  100.0  86.6 
-  .56  -  2.97  -  .29 
Sources:  Euromark  interest rate: OECD,  Financial Statistics Monthly (computer diskette) for 
1966-75;  thereafter from Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets.  German interbank 
rate: Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets. 
Note:  See the note to table 11.3. 
larly, the 95% band is much larger in  the period of  controls than in  either 
noncontrol period. In the control period, the 95% band includes a differential 
as large as 8.89%.  Differentials that large are unheard of  in periods free of 
controls. In this situation, it paid multinational firms to finance as much  as 
possible outside Germany and to build up working balances behind the con- 
trol barrier in Germany. 
Figure 1  1.2 illustrates the variation in the differential during the period of 
the controls and the period directly after the removal of controls. The differ- 
ential was  almost uniformly negative since the  controls inhibited outward 
flows of funds. It is evident from the figure that the stringency of the controls 
varied widely, with the controls being most binding in 1972 and 1973. 
11.1.3  U.S. Controls 
The last sets of controls to be studied are those imposed on U.S. residents 
in the 190s. The U.S. balance of payments deteriorated in the 1960s as the 
dollar became increasingly overvalued relative to other major currencies. The 
Kennedy administration responded by  imposing an interest equalization tax 
on foreign securities purchased by Americans, but it was only later, during the 
Johnson  administration, that  comprehensive capital controls were  put  in 
characteristics of Euromark deposits and German interbank deposits. See the discussion of default 
risk in the dollar markets below. 526  Richard C. Marston 





1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Fig. 11.2  EuromarWGerman Differentials, 1970(1b1976(12) 
Sources: Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets; and OECD, Financial Statistics 
Monthly 
place. These controls restricted outflows of capital by both banks and nonbank 
residents. For example,  under the Voluntary  Foreign Credit Restraint Pro- 
gram, there were restrictions on lending abroad by  commercial banks and 
nonbank financial institutions. There were also restrictions on direct invest- 
ment under the Foreign Direct Investment Program.  These controls made it 
difficult to fund foreign operations from the United States and led to large 
differentials between interest  rates  in  U.S.  markets  and  those  in  markets 
abroad, including the Eurodollar market. The effects of the capital controls 
were complicated by  banking regulations that put ceilings on interest rates 
paid on bank deposits, including certificates of deposit (CDs). Regulation Q 
of  the  Federal Reserve  limited  CD rates  on  three-month deposits to  6% 
through 1969 and 6.75% beginning in January 1970. 
Figure 11.3 illustrates the combined effects of the controls and Regulation 
Q ceilings on interest rates in the major dollar markets. The figure shows that 
the interest rate ceiling resulted in an inversion of the normal relation between 
Treasury bill (TB) rates and CD rates. In  1968-70,  the TB rate was often 
above the CD rate when the latter hit its ceiling. The effects of  the capital 
controls are evident in the widening differentials between Eurodollar rates and 
TB rates. In  1969, that differential rose over 4% per annum. With controls 
inhibiting funds flowing from the United States to London, the Eurodollar rate 
17. The controls are described in International Monetary Fund (1975). 527  Interest Differentials under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates 
3  MONTH RATES IN PERCENT/ANNUM 
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Fig. 11.3  Eurodollars and U.S. Interest Rates, Period of Controls, 1966(1k 
1973(  12) 
Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markers 
rose way  above U.S.  rates. A U.S.  (or foreign) firm was able to raise funds 
much more cheaply in the United States, although, because of the controls, 
these funds could not generally be used for foreign operations. 
Table 11.6  reports interest differentials between the Eurodollar and the U.S. 
markets for two time periods: (a)  the period of  U.S. capital controls, 1966(1t 
1973(12), and (b) the postcontrol period, 1974(1)-1989(7).  As in the case of 
the German controls, the control period extended into the period after the 
Bretton Woods system collapsed, so the division between control and post- 
control periods does not coincide very well with the division between fixed 
and flexible periods. The interest rates-end-of-month  rates for three-month 
instruments-are  drawn from Morgan Guaranty Trust's World Financial Mar- 
kers. For the period of the controls, the table reports two sets of differentials: 
the Eurodollar-CD differential and the Eurodollar-TB differential. The latter 
differential is free of the distortions caused by the Regulation Q ceilings. 
The table reveals large differentials during the control period. The differen- 
tial between Eurodollar and CD rates averaged 1.35% with the 95% band 
occurring as a differential of 4.17%. The differential involving the TB rate 
was  of  similar size. Both sets of  differentials are statistically different from 
zero at the 5% level. The capital controls were evidently binding for much of 
the period. 
Comparing the control and the postcontrol periods, it is evident that U.S. 
controls resulted in raising the relative costs of  financing in the Eurodollar 528  Richard C. Marston 
lsble 11.6  Interest Differentials  between the Eurodollar and U.S. Markets 
(in %/annum, 1966[1]-1989[7]) 
Control Period, 
1966(  1)-1973(  12)  Postcontrol Period, 
1974(  1  )-1989(7), 
Euro-$ICD  Euro-$/TB  Euro-$/CD 
~~~ 
No. of obs. 
Sample mean 
SE of mean 
t-statistic 
96  96  I87 
1.35  1.66  .53 
.20  .I5  .06 
6.71*  10.85*  9.01* 




100.0  100.0  98.4 
1.35  1.66  .54 
Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets (various issues) 
market by  a little over  1%, and even more in  1969 and 1970,~  when interest 
differentials reached their peak. By cutting off the Eurodollar market from its 
national counterpart,  moreover, the U. S . controls encouraged the develop- 
ment of the former. Firms that were not allowed to draw on U.S. markets for 
their financing naturally turned to the Eurodollar market. The interest differ- 
entials between these two markets never reached the size found in the German 
market, but the controls had a major effect on the relative costs of financing. 
In the postcontrol period, the differential between the Eurodollar and the 
CD rates averaged 0.53% with the 95% band occurring at a rate of  1.50%. 
This differential is much smaller than during the control period but larger than 
differentials in the mark and sterling markets after controls were removed. 
Much of this differential can be explained by banking regulations that require 
banks to hold reserves against deposits at U.S. banks but that exempt Euro- 
dollar deposits from reserve requirernents.ls During some of the postcontrol 
years, however, the interest differential between Eurodollar and CD rates was 
much larger than 0.53%. The first period was in 1974-75,  during the Herstatt 
Bank crisis, and the second period was in 1980-83,  when U.S. bank lending 
came under scrutiny. Both sets of years were free of capital controls, so higher 
interest rates in the Eurodollar market must be attributed to the market’s as- 
sessment of risks. Consider the period of  the Herstatt crisis. During that pe- 
riod, the market demanded risk premiums for bank deposit rates whether the 
deposits were in the U.S. or the Eurodollar markets. The U.S. CD rate at 
18. At  times,  the U.S. authorities have  imposed reserve requirements on liabilities of  U.S. 
banks to their foreign branches but not on the dollar deposits of these branches. For a discussion 
of  the effects of reserve requirements on relative interest rates, see Kreicher (1982). 529  Interest Differentials under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates 
times rose several percentage points above the TB rate as investors moved to 
the safety of government securities.19  The Eurodollar rate, in turn, rose above 
CD rates, even when both deposits were at branches of the same bank, be- 
cause of a perception that Eurodollar deposits were subject to greater default 
risk. Similar differentials emerged during the period 1980-83,  especially after 
the Mexican debt crisis, which began in August 1982.” The interest differen- 
tial found in the postcontrol period suggests that investigators should be wary 
about ignoring default premiums when comparing national and Eurocurrency 
rates. 
11.2  Exchange Risk and Uncovered Interest Parity 
Once exchange rates became flexible early in  1973, governments could 
contemplate removing controls on their markets since they no longer faced 
balance of payments constraints. Two of the first countries to remove controls 
were the United States and Germany at the end of 1973. Britain retained con- 
trols until June 1979 because of the chronic weakness of sterling. But, since 
that time, all three countries have been free of capital controls. 
As we have seen, the removal of controls permits investors to take advan- 
tage of interest differentials between the Eurocurrency and the national mar- 
kets. But, with flexible rates, firms are faced with a new factor affecting the 
cost of  financing, unanticipated changes in exchange rates. Exchange rates 
are notoriously difficult to predict, and ex post returns vary widely depending 
on whatever exchange rates prevail at the time of repayment. So flexible ex- 
change rates lead to the emergence of foreign exchange risk premiums, which 
may drive wedges between ex ante returns in different markets. 
11.2.1 
To  examine the effects of risk premiums on relative returns, consider the 
comparison of  returns in the U.S.  and British markets.  If  both returns are 
expressed in sterling, then the expected (ex ante) interest differential between 
U.S. and British interest rates can be written as follows: 
Deviations from Uncovered Interest Parity 
(3) 
where x,  is the expected change in the pound price of the dollar, E, [In (S,+ 
S,)].  In the absence of barriers to investment such as capital controls or polit- 
ical risk, U,, is a measure of the risk premium separating the returns in the two 
19. Over the whole postcontrol period, the average premium of CD rates over TB rates was 
0.77% with the 95% band occumng at 2.14%. Treasury bills are free of state and local income 
taxes, so, even in the absence of  default risk, there would be a gap between TB and CD rates. 
With a marginal state and local tax rate of 5% and a CD rate of  lo%,  a gap of  0.50% can be 
attributed to taxes alone (see Cook 1986). 
20. Even without the debt crisis, higher interest rates might have increased default risk on CDs 
because higher rates increase the risk of default on bank loans. 530  Richard C. Marston 
markets. But, in the presence of capital controls or political risk, U,,  reflects 
both the exchange risk premium and a country premium. To  isolate the ex- 
change risk premium, therefore, we turn to the corresponding Eurocurrency 
interest differentials, which are free of country premiums. 
Measuring that  risk premium is difficult because we  cannot observe ex- 
change rate expectations directly. What we do observe is the actual (ex post) 
interest differential, which can be decomposed into the expected differential 
and a forecast error: 
(4) 
where s,  is the actual change in the spot exchange rate, In (SE,+,/SEJ.  The 
error term,  E~~,  reflects the combined influence of  two factors, the risk pre- 
mium and the forecast error. If the exchange market is efficient, the forecast 
error should have an expected value equal to zero. So the expected value of  E,~ 
should reflect the exchange risk premium alone. 
In any sample period, however, the average value of  -clr, representing the 
average uncovered interest differential, need not be equal to zero even in the 
absence of  a risk premium. First, there may be discrete changes in the ex- 
change rate that are expected but not realized in that particular sample period. 
This phenomenon has been called the “peso problem” (in reference to the 
behavior of the Mexican peso prior to its devaluation in 1976).21  Peso prob- 
lems can be found in fixed exchange rate periods when parity changes are 
possible, but they may also occur in flexible rate periods if major economic 
disturbances (including shifts in policy regimes) are expected. The second 
reason that average uncovered differentials may not be equal to zero is that the 
market may be learning about changes in regimes that have occurred. In that 
case, forecast errors may be systematically positive or negative even though 
market participants are processing information in a rational manner.  22 With 
longer  sample periods,  however,  forecast  errors  associated with  learning 
should become less of a problem unless there are frequent changes in regimes. 
11.2.2  Evidence on Uncovered Interest Parity 
In table 11.7,  I present sample means for the uncovered interest differentials 
between the Eurodollar rate and four other Eurocurrency rates.23  The differ- 
entials are reported for both fixed and flexible exchange rate periods as well 
as for the entire sample. The fixed rate  sample period beings in the early 
1960s, whenever a Eurocurrency interest rate series first becomes available 
21. For a concise discussion of the peso problem, see Froot and Thaler (19%). 
22. Market participants, e.g.,  may use Bayesian methods to update their expectations, as in 
23. These differentials are calculated as follows (for the Eurosterling case): 
Lewis (1989). 
{In [I + (1,,/400)  ] + In (Su+ 3/So) -  In  [l + (1,/400) ] } x 400, 
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Table 11.7  Uncovered Interest Differentials between the Euromarkets: 
Eurodollar Rate Minus Other Eurocurrency Rates 
(in %/annum,  various periods) 
Bretton Woods  Flexible Rates  Post-Bretton 
Period  Period  Woods Period  Whole Sample 
Eurosterling 
No. of  obs. 
Mean 
SE of mean 
t-statistic 
Euromark 
No. of obs. 
Mean 
SE of  mean 
t-statistic 
Euroguilder 
No. of  obs. 
Mean 




No. of obs. 
Mean 
SE of mean 
?-statistic 
196  l(4)-  1973(1)-  1971(5)-  196  1 (4t 
197  1  (  1)  1989(7)  1989(7)  1989(7) 
118  199  219  340 
-  .I5  .I0  -  .07  -  .12 
1.51  3.05  2.82  1.89 
-.lo  .03  -  .03  -  .07 
1963(1)-  1973(1)-  197  l(5)-  1963( 1)- 
1971(1)  1989(7)  1989(7)  1989(7) 
97  199  219  319 
-  .01  .85  .01  -.13 
.84  3.16  2.93  2.03 
-  .01  .27  .oo  -  .07 
1962( I)-  1973(1)-  1971(5)-  1962(1)- 
1971(  1)  1989(7)  1989(7)  1989(7) 
109  199  219  33  1 
.62  .43  -  .35  -  .06 
.29  3.14  2.91  1.93 
2.15*  .I4  -  .I2  -  .03 
1963( 1)-  1973( I)-  1971(5)-  1963(1& 
1971( 1)  1989(7)  1989(7)  1989(7) 
97  199  219  319 
1.03  .83  -  .07  .10 
.27  3.56  3.33  2.29 
3.79*  .23  -  .02  .04 
Sources: For Eurodollar/Eurosterling  comparisons,  Bank of  England,  Quarterly  Bulletin.  For 
other Eurocurrency comparisons, OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly (interest rates until 1976); 
Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets (interest rates from 1976 on); IMF, Interna- 
rional Financial Statistics (for exchange rates). 
Note: The Bretton Woods sample period ends in January 1971 since the three-month (ex post) 
return beginning in January spans the three months ending in April 1971.  Differentials marked 
with an asterisk (*) are statistically different from zero at the 5%  level. 532  Richard C. Marston 
for that currency, and ends in January 1971. As discussed above, the Bretton 
Woods period is assumed to end in April 1971 prior to the floating of the mark 
and guilder in mid-May  1971. In order for the (ex post) three-month returns 
to be defined entirely within the Bretton Woods period, the last observation 
must be in January 1971. The flexible period extends from January 1973 until 
the end of the sample period in  July 1989. Table 11.7 also reports separate 
statistics for the post-Bretton  Woods period beginning in May 1971. 
The Bank of England’s series for Eurodollar and Eurosterling rates begins 
in April 1961, so there are 340 monthly observations available for these rates. 
The first row of table 1  1.7 reports the mean uncovered differentials between 
these rates over various periods. During the Bretton Woods period, the mean 
uncovered differential is equal to -  0.15% per annum, with a standard devia- 
tion for this mean of  1.51%. During the flexible period, the mean differential 
is somewhat smaller in absolute value at 0.10%, but with a much larger stan- 
dard deviation of 3.05%. Neither of these means is statistically different from 
zero. Both are also small in economic terms, being comparable to the covered 
interest differentials between Eurocurrency rates reported in section 11.1. The 
average uncovered differential is also small over the twenty-eight-year sample 
period as a whole, during which the mean differential is  -0.12%,  and over 
the  post-Bretton  Woods  period,  during  which  the  mean  differential  is 
Uncovered interest differentials between Eurodollar and Euromark rates are 
reported in the second row of table 1  1.7.  The sample period begins in January 
1963, when Euromark interest rates were first published by the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and ends in July 1989. 
During the Bretton Woods period from January 1963 to April 1971, the mean 
uncovered differential between Eurodollars and Euromarks is -  0.01% with a 
standard deviation of 0.84%. During the flexible period, the mean increases 
to 0.85% per annum with a standard deviation of 3.16%. Although this mean 
is not significantly different from zero, it is nonetheless much larger than cov- 
ered interest differentials for Eurocurrency rates. The mark appreciated sub- 
stantially against the dollar between the end of the Bretton Woods period and 
the beginning of  1973, so, by  extending the sample period back until May 
1971, the mean uncovered  differential falls to 0.01% per annum. For the 
whole sample period beginning in January 1963, moreover, the mean differ- 
ential is only -  0.13%. 
Table 11.7 also reports statistics for the only other Eurocurrency rates avail- 
able from the early 1960s, the Euroguilder and Euro-Swiss franc. The results 
are similar to those of the other Eurocurrencies. There are uncovered interest 
-0.07%.24 
24. The table does not report the bands within which 95%  of the observations lie since the width 
of these bands would primarily reflect the size of the forecast errors rather than risk premiums (or 
peso phenomena). Only by averaging the ex post interest differentials over long sample periods 
are we able to abstract from such forecast errors. 533  Interest Differentials under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates 
differentials ranging from  -0.07%  to  1.03% for subperiods. Two of  these 
interest differentials, those defined for the Bretton Woods period in the first 
column of the table, are statistically different from zero. As discussed below, 
the excess returns on Eurodollars relative to Euroguilders and Euro-Swiss 
francs may be compensating for an expected appreciation of these curren- 
cies-an  appreciation that did not in fact occur until after the end of Bretton 
Woods. The mean differentials for the whole sample period are only -0.06% 
for Euroguilders and 0.10% for Euro-Swiss  francs. Comparable differentials 
are found for Euro-French  francs for the period from January 1973 to July 
1989.25 
There is some evidence of peso problems in shorter sample periods during 
the 1960s-specifically,  prior to the devaluation of sterling in November 1967 
and the revaluation of the mark in October 1969. If a devaluation or revalua- 
tion is anticipated, there will be  ex post deviations from uncovered interest 
parity until the change in parity actually occurs. Table  11.8 compares uncov- 
ered interest differentials for the whole Bretton Woods period (starting when 
Eurocurrency data became available) with differentials for the periods ending 
prior  to  these  changes  in  parities.26 The results  suggest  that  these parity 
changes may have been anticipated. If  the sample period for sterling returns 
ends prior to the sterling devaluation of November 1967, the average uncov- 
ered differential is 1.20%  in favor of sterling relative to the dollar. The higher 
return for sterling compensated the investor for the expected loss due to the 
devaluation of  sterling. If  the sample period for the mark ends prior to the 
mark  revaluation in  September 1969, the average uncovered differential is 
1.14% in favor of the dollar relative to the mark. In this case, the higher return 
for the dollar compensated the investor for the expected gain on the mark due 
to its revaluation. In both cases, the average interest differentials are statisti- 
cally different from zero (at the 5%  level). Over the whole sample period, 
however, the uncovered interest differentials are very close to zero. 
Neither the Dutch guilder nor the Swiss franc was revalued during the Bret- 
ton Woods sample period,*’ but both currencies were revalued in the Smith- 
sonian Agreement of December 197  1, which tried to reestablish fixed parities 
(although with wider bands of 2.25%). Table 11.9 examines uncovered inter- 
est differentials for the Bretton Woods period through December 1971  .**  The 
average uncovered interest differential for the Eurodollar relative to the Euro- 
25. Euro-French  franc rates are available from the  OECD only beginning in  January  1973. 
Over this period, the mean uncovered interest differential between the Eurodollar and the Eur+ 
French franc is -0.40% with a standard error of 2.97%. 
26. In the case of sterling, the period ends in July  1967 because the three-month return begin- 
ning at  the end of August overlaps with the November devaluation. The mark  was floated on 28 
September and formally revalued on 24 October 1969, so the last observation is in May  1969, 
with the return defined over the period May-August. 
27. The guilder was revalued by 4.7%  in 1961 prior to the beginning of the sample period. 
28. The last observation is in September 1971 because the return defined for that month spans 
the period September-December 1971. 534  Richard C. Marston 
Table 11.8  Uncovered Interest Differentials  under Bretton Woods: Sample 
Periods Including and Excluding Changes in Parities 
Eurodollar-Eurosterling  Eurodollar-Euromark 
Bretton Woods  Prior to 1967  Bretton Woods  Prior to 1969 
Period,  Devaluation of  E,  Period,  Revaluation, 
1961@)-1971(  1)  1961(4t1967(7)  1963(  1  j197  I (1)  1963(  1)-1969(5) 
No. of  obs.  118  76  97  77 
Mean  -.15  -  1.20  -  .01  1.14 
SE of  mean  1.51  .32  .84  .44 
t-statistic  -.I0  -3.69*  -  .01  2.60* 
Sources: Same as table 11.7. 
Note:  The devaluation of  sterling occurred in November 1967, so the three-month return from 
the end of August to the end of November 1967 reflects the devaluation of  sterling. Accordingly, 
the sample period excluding the devaluation ends in July 1967. The mark was revalued in October 
1969, but it was floated on 28 September, so the last observation is in May  1969. 
Table 11.9  Uncovered Interest Differentials: Bretton Woods Period 
through Smithsonian Agreement 
Eurodollar-Euroguilder  Eurodollar-Euro-Swiss  franc 
Bretton Woods  Through  Bretton Woods  Through 
1962(  lj1971(  1)  1962(  1)-1971(9)  1963(  1)-1971(  1)  1963(  1)-1971(9) 
Period,  Smithsonian,  Period,  Smithsonian, 
No. of  obs.  109  117  97  105 
Mean  .62  -.I4  1.03  .22 
SE of  mean  .29  .60  .27  .66 
r-statistic  2.15*  -  .24  3.79*  .34 
Source?: Same as table 11.7. 
Note:  The Smithsonian Agreement was signed in December 1971, so the last observation is the 
three-month return spanning the period September-December  1971. 
guilder declines from 0.62% for the Bretton Woods period alone to -  0.14% 
for the period including the Smithsonian Agreement. Similarly, the differen- 
tial for the dollar relative to the Swiss franc declines from 1.03% to 0.22%. 
So, in both cases, the revaluations between May and December 1971 compen- 
sated investors for the lower interest rates paid on the guilder and the Swiss 
franc prior to the breakdown of Bretton Woods. 
11.2.3  Interpretations of the Evidence on Uncovered Differentials 
The evidence presented in tables 11.7-1 1.9 suggests that average uncov- 
ered interest differentials are close to zero over long sample periods under both 
fixed and flexible exchange rates. If  average uncovered interest differentials 
are this small, then ex ante uncovered interest differentials must also be quite 535  Interest Differentials under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates 
small on average since forecast errors should have an average value close to 
zero over these long sample periods. But, in that case, exchange risk premi- 
ums must also be small on average. 
These results do not rule out the existence of timevarying risk premiums 
that are both positive and negative for shorter sample periods.29  But, to be 
consistent with the evidence, these risk premiums would have to have a mean 
close to zero over the long sample periods studied here. Nor do the results rule 
out the possibility of systematic forecast errors that do not have a mean of zero 
over shorter sample periods. Forecast errors could be systematically positive 
or negative over shorter periods either because (as explained above) the mar- 
ket is learning about changes in regimes or because of expectations that there 
might be  a regime switch in the future (the peso problem). But,  over the 
longer sample periods studied here, risk premiums and forecast errors have 
little net effect on uncovered interest differentials. 
The unconditional estimates of uncovered differentials in tables 1  1.7-1 1.9 
provide a different perspective on risk premiums than conditional  estimates 
based on time-series regressions. These regressions relate uncovered interest 
differentials to variables in the current information set such as in the following 
equation: 
(ist + s,  -  if,) = a + PZ,  + E~~, 
where Z, is a variable or a set of variables known at period t.30  If  P is signifi- 
cantly different from zero, then there is said to be evidence of  time-varying 
risk premiums (or, alternatively, evidence of forecast errors systematically re- 
lated to current variables). To investigate this possibility, I estimated equations 
explaining the uncovered differentials for four Eurocurrencies (relative to the 
dollar) as a function of  three variables in the current information set: the 
simple interest differential (e.g., i, -  if),  the percentage change in the spot 
rate over the previous twelve months, and the inflation differential over the 
previous twelve  month^.^' The results are reported in table 11.10 for two al- 
ternative post-Bretton  Woods periods beginning in May  1971 and January 
1973. 
The first column of  table  11.10 gives the mean of  the fitted values from 
each regression. This conditional mean measures the average risk premium 
over the period (or, alternatively, the average forecast  The second col- 
umn reports the F-statistics testing whether the explanatory variables in the 
regressions are jointly significant. Except in the case of the mark, regression 
29. Fama (1984), for example, attributes much of the variance in forward market forecast errors 
to a time-varying risk premium. 
30. Conditional estimates are provided in numerous studies, including Bilson (1981), Cumby 
and Obstfeld (1984), and Fama (1984). Hodrick (1987) surveys this literature. 
31. Frankel and MacArthur (1988) use a similar set of variables in their study of interest differ- 
entials in the period 1982-86. 
32. Each conditional mean, defined as a + PZ,,  where Z,  is the average value of Z,, is equal to 
the corresponding unconditional mean of table 11.7 because of the properties of the least squares. 536  Richard C. Marston 
Table 11.10  Unconditional and Conditional Estimates of Uncovered Differentials: 
Eurodollar Rate Minus Other Eurocurrency  Rates (in %/annum) 
~  ~~  ~ 
SE of  SE of Residual 
Mean of  F-Stat. for  (Uncondit .)  from 
Conditional  Conditional  Uncovered Interest  Conditional 
Estimate  Estimate  Differential  Estimate 
197  1  (5)-1989(7): 
Eurosterling 
E  u  r  o  m  ar  k 
Euroguilder 
EureSwiss franc 




Euro-Swiss  franc 
-  .07 
.01 
-  .35 





























Sources: Same as table 11.7. 
Note: The standard error of the residual is obtained from a regression of  the uncovered interest 
differential on variables in the current information set (as described in the text). The F-statistic 
tests the restriction that all coefficients are equal to zero. The standard errors and F-statistics have 
been adjusted for overlapping observations. 
coefficients in all the equations are statistically significant at the 5% 
So there does seem to be a systematic element in the uncovered interest differ- 
entials, whether it is due to risk premiums or systematic forecast errors. 
The last two columns of the table, however, suggest that most of the move- 
ment in the uncovered interest differential remains unexplained. The third col- 
umn reports the unconditional standard errors of the uncovered interest differ- 
entials, while the fourth column reports the standard errors of the residuals 
from the estimated equations. These latter conditional standard errors are al- 
most as large as the unconditional errors, thus indicating that unsystematic 
forecast errors rather than risk premiums or systematic errors account for most 
of the variability of the interest differentials. 
To summarize this evidence, there does seem to be a systematic component 
to uncovered interest differentials that can be attributed to risk premiums or 
peso-type phenomena. But the mean of this systematic component is close to 
zero,  and  most  of  the  variation  in  uncovered  differentials remains  unex- 
plained. So there may be time-varying risk premiums (or systematic forecast 
errors) evident in the data, but they account for only a fraction of  the total 
variation in the uncovered differentials, and their average effect on any interest 
differential is close to zero. 
We  can compare the estimates of  the average exchange risk premiums of 
33. These results are consistent with most previous evidence based on regression analysis (such 
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tables 11.7-1 1.10 with the country premiums for the three national markets 
reported earlier in tables 11.4-1 1.6. The uncovered interest differentials mea- 
sured over the long sample periods in table l l .7 are substantially smaller than 
those due to capital controls in  the national  markets as reported in tables 
11.4-1 1.6. Consider the case of Euromark interest rates. In table 11.5, the 
average differential between Euromark and German interest rates is -  2.97% 
during the capital control period from April  1970 to January 1974. In table 
1  1.7, the average uncovered differential between Eurodollar and Euromark 
interest rates is only  -0.13%  over the entire sample period and from 0.01% 
to 0.85% over shorter sample periods. The country premiums measured in 
tables 1  1.4-1 1.6, moreover, are average premiums, so they underestimate the 
effects of  the capital controls during periods when the controls were most 
binding (such as 1969-70  in the United States).”  At the very least, we  can 
say that capital controls under fixed rates can lead to ex ante interest differen- 
tials at least as large as those due to exchange risk premiums under flexible 
rates. 
Fixed exchange rates do not necessarily require capital controls to sustain 
them, at least if  the national monetary authority is willing to refrain from 
pursuing a monetary policy independent of  those abroad. So fixed exchange 
rates could bring the best of both regimes: free capital mobility combined with 
limited exchange rate volatility. But the Bretton Woods system itself degener- 
ated into a system plagued with controls. And that system led to interest dif- 
ferentials that are large by  any standard and, more specifically, larger than 
average differentials under flexible rates in the absence of controls. 
11.3  Conclusion 
This paper has examined evidence on interest differentials under fixed and 
flexible rates.  The paper has  shown that,  in three major national markets, 
capital controls imposed during the Bretton Woods period led to large covered 
interest differentials that distorted investment and borrowing decisions. The 
three countries involved-Britain,  Germany, and the United States-all  re- 
laxed controls under flexible rates, although Britain maintained its controls 
until as late as 1978. The paper compared these covered interest differentials 
with uncovered interest differentials in Eurocurrency markets that are free of 
capital controls. In both fixed and flexible periods, average uncovered interest 
differentials between the Eurodollar market and four other Eurocurrency mar- 
kets studied are in many cases close to zero. So, if exchange risk premiums 
are present, they must be time varying with a mean close to zero over the long 
sample periods studied in the paper. 
34. Exchange risk premiums may also vary through time, although, as explained above, it is 
difficult to measure these premiums over short intervals. In  a short sample period, the average 
forecast error need not be  close to zero, so the average uncovered interest differential as measured 
by E!, in eq.  (4) may not reflect an exchange risk premium alone. 538  Richard C. Marston 
References 
Aliber, Robert Z. 1973. The Interest Rate Parity Theorem: A Reinterpretation. Journal 
of  Political Economy (NovemberDecember): 145  1-59. 
Artis, M. J., and Mark P.  Taylor. 1989. Abolishing Exchange Control: The U.K. Ex- 
perience. Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper no. 294. April. 
Bilson,  John.  1981.  The  Speculative  Efficiency Hypothesis.  Journal  of  Business 
Clinton, Kevin. 1988. Transactions Costs and Covered Interest Arbitrage: Theory and 
Evidence. Journal of  Political Economy (April):358-70. 
Cook, Timothy Q.  1986. Treasury Bills.  In Instruments of  the Money Market, ed. 
Timothy Q. Cook and Timothy D. Rowe, 81-93.  Richmond, Va.: Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond. 
Cumby, Robert E., and Maurice Obstfeld.  1984. International Interest Rate and Price 
Level Linkages under Flexible Exchange Rates: A Review of Recent Evidence. In 
Exchange Rate Theory and Practice, ed. John Bilson and Richard Marston, 121-51. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Deutsche Bundesbank.  1985. Freedom of Germany’s Capital Transactions with For- 
eign Countries. Monthly Report (July): 13-23. 
Dooley, Michael P., and Peter Isard. 1980. Capital Controls, Political Risk, and Devia- 
tions from Interest-Rate Parity. Journal of  Political Economy (April):370-84. 
Eichengreen, Barry.  1989. The Comparative Performance of Fixed and Flexible Ex- 
change Rate Regimes: Interwar Evidence. Centre for Economic Policy Research 
Discussion Paper no. 349. November. 
Fama, Eugene F. 1984. Forward and Spot Exchange Rates. Journal of  Monetary Eco- 
nomics (November):697-703. 
Frankel, Jeffrey, and Alan MacArthur. 1988. Political vs. Currency Premia in Intema- 
tional Real Interest Rate Differentials: A Study of Forward Rates for 24 Countries. 
Europenn Economic Review (June): 1083-1 114. 
Frenkel, Jacob, and Richard Levich.  1975. Covered Interest Arbitrage: Unexploited 
Profits? Journal of  Political Economy (April):325-38. 
Froot,  Kenneth  A., and Richard  H. Thaler.  1990. Anomalies: Foreign  Exchange. 
Journal of  Economic Perspectives (Summer): 179-92. 
Giovannini, Alberto.  1988. How Do Fixed-Exchange-Rates Regimes Work: The Evi- 
dence from the Gold Standard, Bretton Woods, and the EMS. Centre for Economic 
Policy Research Discussion Paper no. 282. October. 
Hodrick, Robert.  1987. The Empirical Evidence on the Eficiency of Forward and Fu- 
tures Foreign Exchange Markets. Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic. 
International Monetary Fund. 1975. Twenty-sixth Annual Report on Exchange Restric- 
tions. Washington, D.C. 
Kreicher, Lawrence L.  1982. Eurodollar Arbitrage. Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Quarterly Review (Summer): 10-22. 
Lewis, Karen.  1989. Changing Beliefs and Systematic Rational Forecast Errors with 
Evidence  from  Foreign  Exchange.  American  Economic  Review  (September): 
McKinnon, Ronald I. 1988. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies for International 
Financial Stability: A Proposal. Journal of Economic Perspectives (Winter):83-103. 
Marston, Richard C. 1976. Interest Arbitrage in the Euro-Currency Markets. Euro- 
pean Economic Review (January): 1-1  3. 
(J~ly):435-52. 
621-36. 539  Interest Differentials under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates 
Comment  Paul Krugman 
This is a classic Marston paper: seemingly simple statistical techniques are 
used with high intelligence on carefully assembled data, yielding a set of facts 
that change your view of the way the world works much more effectively than 
any fancy econometrics. 
The most striking result of  the paper is its demonstration that the Bretton 
Woods system bore very little resemblance to the golden age of financial mar- 
kets that many people now  think that they remember. Capital controls were 
pervasive, and they led to large, systematic interest differentials. As Marston 
shows, the long-term differences in interest rates under Bretton Woods+ra 
capital controls were much larger than the long-term differences in uncovered 
yields under floating. This suggests that, much as we  may complain about 
risk, peso problems, speculative inefficiency, etc. under floating rates, the net 
barrier posed by all these to the long-run ability of capital to flow to where its 
yield is highest is trivial. A little bit of government restriction in the 1960s did 
more to deter long-run arbitrage than all the exchange rate volatility the 1980s 
could muster. 
I am impressed and convinced by this result. But what should we conclude 
from it? Marston does not offer any explicit welfare assessment. Implicitly, 
however,  his paper  seems to  suggest the  following  syllogism: (i) Bretton 
Woods “degenerated into a system plagued by controls”; (ii) attempts to re- 
store more or less fixed rates are likely to experience the same fate; (iii) this is 
a cost of  fixed rates that helps tip the balance in favor of continued floating. 
What I want to do is to be very unfair and disagree not with what Marston 
actually says-which  is point i-but  with what he does not say,  points ii 
and iii. 
First, it is by no means clear that future efforts at fixed rates will be marked 
by  the growth of an underbrush of capital controls. The major European na- 
tions show no inclination to bolster the European Monetary System by impos- 
ing controls, and, while Portugal and Spain are at present trying to impose 
some limits on capital mobility, this is largely motivated by the peculiar Maas- 
trict requirement that they get their inflation rates in line with Germany’s, even 
while maintaining a fixed exchange rate, in the face of massive, entirely vol- 
untary inward investment. 
In fact, it is somewhat puzzling in retrospect why capital controls were so 
frequently imposed in the 1960s. After all, the major nations had the option 
of  stabilizing their currencies by  changing domestic interest rates, and, de- 
spite the substantial differentials that Marston documents, it seems unlikely 
that controls gave them much really usable independence of monetary policy. 
Paul  Krugman is professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a 
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Why, then, were policymakers who on average were a good deal smarter than 
the ones we have today so quick to impose limits on the free flow of capital? 
I would offer a hypothesis, one that leads into the discussion of point iii. 
The reason why governments were so quick to regulate capital flows in the 
Bretton Woods era was that their domestic capital markets were highly regu- 
lated. In an environment of controlled interest rates, dealing with capital flows 
was not as simple as adjusting the Fed funds rate: many key interest rates were 
fixed, and changing those that were flexible could create problems for finan- 
cial  institutions,  for example,  through  disintermediation. So governments 
were often tempted to solve the dilemma through direct controls, which any- 
way  did not seem particularly sacrilegious in an environment where a lot of 
financial instruments were controlled anyway. 
Today,  of  course,  financial markets have been  substantially deregulated. 
Investors are free to pursue a variety of possibilities for arbitrage, and inter- 
national financial movements are a natural part of that freedom. 
The problem is that it is by no means clear that all this financial freedom is 
a good thing. While investment is deregulated, there is still a lot of distortion 
of incentives: deposit insurance explicit and implicit, taxes, etc. It is a good 
bet that much of  the frenetic financial activity of  our times is motivated by 
these distortions rather than by  true economic opportunities and has low or 
even negative marginal product. 
This is also true of international capital movements. Take, for example, the 
late-1980s surge in Japanese purchases of  U.S. real estate and corporations. 
Was  this a productive resource transfer made possible by  the freeing up of 
global capital markets? Now  that some of the dust has settled, it seems du- 
bious. Instead, it looks like an international spillover of the Japanese domestic 
financial bubble, which was at a basic level a giant crisis of  moral hazard, 
brought on by  a half-deregulation comparable to our own past savings and 
loan crisis and future banking crisis. 
So maybe the Bretton Woods era was a kind of golden age, but not the kind 
we now imagine. It was not a time of free markets flourishing in an environ- 
ment  of  exchange stability. Instead,  it  was  a time  when  financial markets 
worked acceptably precisely because regulation and controls were sufficient 
to limit the moral hazard that has driven so much lucrative but destructive 
financial action in our own time. The capital controls of the Bretton Woods 
era may not have made a great deal of sense-but  then the free capital flows 
of our own time do not make much sense either. 541  Interest Differentials under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates 
Comment  Allan H. Meltzer 
Richard Marston has produced some interesting and informative results on the 
differences in domestic and foreign interest rates under fixed and fluctuating 
exchange rates.  Since the organizers called this session “Post-197 1 Experi- 
ence in the Light of Bretton Woods,” I will discuss the two main findings of 
his paper for this topic. First is the evidence he presents showing that there 
were relatively large distortions in country interest rates resulting from ex- 
change controls during the fixed exchange rate period. Second is the issue he 
raises about the alleged costs of fluctuating rates. 
Marston remarks that  those who look back nostalgically on the Bretton 
Woods system ignore the costs of exchange controls. These critics of fluctuat- 
ing rates argue that variability of exchange rates since 1971 or 1973 imposed 
risk premiums in exchange rates. They claim that risk premiums reduce for- 
eign investment or inhibit foreign trade. Evidence of these effects on trade and 
investment is hard to produce. Marston shows that it is also difficult to pro- 
duce solid evidence of the existence of variable risk premiums in the foreign 
exchange market, although many researchers have studied this market. I will 
return to this issue. 
Marston notes that recent research on interest rate differentials has concen- 
trated on Eurocurrency interest rates. The purpose is to study time-varying 
risk premiums under fluctuating exchange rates. Marston steps back to study 
costs arising from exchange controls in a fixed exchange rate system. To esti- 
mate these costs, he compares domestic and Eurocurrency rates on short-term 
securities that are as close to comparable as he can find. 
Marston estimates that on average U.K. controls lowered domestic short- 
term rates by  1% a year for nearly twenty years. Controls in Germany, for a 
shorter period, raised domestic rates (reduced capital inflow) by 3% a year for 
three years. U.S. exchange controls lowered domestic interest rates by  1%% 
a year for seven years. 
I find the evidence persuasive as to direction but not entirely as to magni- 
tude. The interest rate differences fall substantially when controls are off. But 
they do not go to zero in the United States or in Germany. Marston’s data show 
that on average an investor could make Y4%  by borrowing in the Euromarket 
and lending in Germany. In the United States, an investor could gain ‘/2%  by 
going the other way-borrowing  at home and lending in the Euromarket. The 
differences are consistently positive.  Marston  suggests that,  in  the United 
States, there are reserve requirements on domestic liabilities. I would add 
costs of deposit insurance. Both were present in the period with controls, so 
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there may be a small bias in the estimated cost of exchange controls. More- 
over, reserve requirements and deposit insurance do not cost ‘/2%  a year. 
For Germany, in the two periods without controls, 80% of the differences 
in rates are negative. Something systematic is missing for the United States 
and Germany, but apparently not for the United Kingdom. Are there differ- 
ences in taxes, or differences in what is counted as reserves, or differences in 
capital requirements that can explain these spreads? I do not know,  but the 
subject is worthy of more attention than the paper gives to it.’ 
One point worth noting before going to the second half of the paper is that 
British controls were supposed to keep capital from going abroad. Yet, when 
controls were removed in  1979, capital flowed in. The pound appreciated. I 
have been told that a significant part of the inflow came from the Euromarkets. 
Removing controls may have been a credible signal that the Thatcher govern- 
ment would not restore them. But can we reconcile the inflow and apprecia- 
tion of  1979 with the evidence of  significantly lower domestic rates in the 
United Kingdom as a result of controls? Was this just fortuitous timing, or did 
the United Kingdom raise domestic rates in advance of the decision? 
The second half of  the paper considers uncovered interest parity. Marston 
presents evidence for four countries showing that uncovered interest differ- 
ences go to zero if the sample is long enough to include both fixed and flexible 
rate periods. On average, the risk premium is positive (but not significant) in 
all four countries during the flexible rate period, so it would have been inter- 
esting to check whether the data may be telling a somewhat different story 
than Marston or the typical study of uncovered differentials. The mean values 
of risk premiums for each of the four countries range from . 10 to .85 with a 
mean value of  ‘/2%  for the four countries as a group. This difference should 
be compared to the average uncovered interest premium under Bretton Woods, 
which Marston shows is a measure of anticipated changes in parities. 
The reason for emphasizing this point is that, under fluctuating rates, un- 
covered differentials are often taken as measures of risk that are part of  the 
excess burden of fluctuating rates. If the differences under fixed rates mainly 
reflect anticipated devaluations or revaluations, Marston asks, why is the same 
argument not applicable to fluctuating rates? Why do we not treat all or part 
of  the unexplained deviation from uncovered interest parity as evidence of 
delayed adjustment of  exchange rates? If this were done, the basis used for 
claiming an excess burden of fluctuating rates would be weaker. 
Some relevant literature strengthens the argument. Karen Lewis showed 
that, when there was a change in monetary regime in the early 1980s, market 
participants were uncertain about the duration of the change.* They systemat- 
1. At the conference, Peter Garber suggested differences in the liquidity of the instruments as 
2. Karen Lewis, “Changing Beliefs and Systematic Rational  Forecast Errors  with Evidence 
another explanation. 
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ically underpredicted the exchange value of  the dollar during the period of 
dollar appreciation. Lewis is able to explain about half the error as a result of 
rational, adaptive learning. 
Earlier, William Krasker showed that tests for the efficiency of the foreign 
exchange market may not be valid if there is an unanticipated large change in 
the exchange rate.3 Alex Cukierman and I, unaware of Krasker’s paper, pro- 
duced a similar re~ult.~  We  showed that, when a large unanticipated perma- 
nent change occurs in a finite sample, tests for the rationality of  expected 
exchange rate changes may incorrectly reject rationality. 
All these cases are first cousins to the well-known peso problem. A large 
change occurs. Market participants learn over time how much of the change 
will persist. Since it takes more than one period to learn whether an unantici- 
pated change is permanent, time must pass before market participants learn 
about the magnitude of change and its persistence. They make errors that, to 
the econometrician, look like serially correlated disturbances, or sluggish ad- 
justment of forward exchange rates, or rejection of uncovered interest parity. 
On  this interpretation, departures from uncovered interest parity are not 
solely a measure of  additional risk arising under fluctuating exchange rates. 
This interpretation would be consistent with the inability of research to find a 
systematic effect of fluctuating rates or risk on investment or trade. 
Before drawing any strong conclusions about variability of fluctuating rates 
and excess burden, it should be recalled that fluctuating rates are not freely 
fluctuating. Consider this. At the end of  1972, G10 countries held about $70 
billion in dollar reserves. By the end of the 1970s, their dollar reserves had 
doubled, and, by the end of the 1980s, they had doubled again to more than 
$300 billion. Some of  these accumulations may have been sterilized; others 
probably were not. Did the market always guess correctly which was which? 
Or should some of  these interventions be classified as unanticipated perma- 
nent changes? 
Marston starts his paper by referring to the high degree of short-term vola- 
tility in exchange rates. I am not convinced that this widely repeated claim is 
correct. Look at the data on monthly multilateral real ex post exchange rates 
under fluctuating rates (fig. 11C.  1). To the naked eye, there appear to be rela- 
tively modest fluctuations, a one-time sharp increase, and a rapid decline to 
about the level that prevailed from 1973 to 1977. 
The sharp increase and decline is clearly associated with the Reagan pro- 
gram of first disinflation and higher risk-adjusted, after-tax real rates of  return 
to capital followed by depreciation and increased taxes on capital in  1985 and 
3. William Krasker, “The ‘Peso Problem’ in Testing for the Efficiency of Forward Exchange 
4. Alex Cukierman and Allan H. Meltzer, “What Do Tests of Market Efficiency Show?“ (Car- 
Markets,”  Journal  of  Monetary Economics 6 (April 1980): 269-76. 
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Fig. llC.l  Real exchange rate, 1973:4-1990:2 (March 1973 = 100) 
1986.5  This looks like the kind of  sudden permanent adjustment that might 
give rise to less than immediate learning and large forecast errors in forward 
rates. 
I have not tested for such errors. However, I have computed the mean and 
variance of changes in real exchange rates for selected periods of fixed and 
fluctuating rates. These data differ from the data in Marston in relevant ways. 
The data in table 11C.  1 here are computed from Federal Reserve multilateral 
real exchange rates.  Also, I attempt to control for differences in policy by 
separating the changes arising from oil shocks and Reagan policies. 
Clearly, variability under fluctuating rates is higher. Equally clear, however, 
is the dominating effect of the Reagan policies. Removing this period changes 
the picture considerably, but it remains true that periods of  fluctuating ex- 
changes have higher variance than the fixed exchange rate period. Even in the 
most stable period, the variance of  changes in real exchange rates is seven 
times higher than under Bretton Woods. The mean depreciation of  the real 
exchange rate is lower under fluctuating rates, however. 
We do not know how much of the increased variability substitutes for vari- 
ability elsewhere in the economy. Nor  do we know whether there is excess 
burden under fluctuating rates. Marston’s paper begins to study the welfare 
5. There were also policy changes in other countries, including Britain, Germany, and Japan, 
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TABLE 11C.1  Means and Variances of Changes in Monthly Multilateral Real 
Exchange Rates (selected periods) 
Fluctuating Rates 
Period  Means  Variance 
1960: 1-1971:8  -  .12  .31 
1960:1-1973:3  -  .25  .71 
1973:3-1980:6  -  .24  3.20 
1973:3-1975:4  -  .51  5.75 
1975:5-1980:6  -.12  2.09 
1980:7-1987:11  .04  8.22 
1987: 12-1 990~2  .10  4.58 
1973:  3-1  990:  2  -  .07  5.60 
issue by showing that there is much more to the comparison of the social costs 
or excess burden of fixed and fluctuating exchange rates than calculation of 
time-varying risk premiums. The paper presents some evidence that should 
broaden the discussion and cast doubt on some premature claims about excess 
burden and welfare loss. 
General Discussion 
There was considerable discussion of Marston’s use of uncovered interest dif- 
ferentials. Alan Stockman took issue with the author’s comparison of  the av- 
erage  foreign  exchange  risk  premium  with  the  average risk  premium  on 
equity. Because equity is a residual claim, it is highly variable. This would 
tend to make the risk premium based on equity and Treasury bills positive. 
Jefrey Frankel agreed with Marston that interest differentials can be used to 
compare different regimes. But he suggested also examining measures of ex- 
pectations of  depreciation such as a comparison of  the Eurodollar interest 
rates with other Euromarket rates. Finding that the exchange risk premium is 
very small does not mean that it cannot have important effects. A small risk 
premium says something about whether domestic and foreign assets are im- 
perfect substitutes and whether sterilized intervention has an  effect. Susan 
Collins argued that looking at interest differentials over long periods may be 
misleading. The differentials may cancel out over decades even if large persis- 
tent differentials exist for substantial subperiods. She suggested looking at 
persistence over a number of years governed by different exchange rate re- 
gimes. Both Collins and Charles Wyplosz suggested that long-term interest 
rates would be a more appropriate measure because they drive the interna- 
tional allocation of capital. 
Alexander Swoboda concurred that Bretton Woods was characterized by 546  Richard C. Marston 
significant capital controls. Yet  it was also a period in which international 
capital markets developed rapidly and capital mobility improved considerably. 
The key reason, he  suggested, why capital markets are much more tightly 
integrated today than in the 1960s is not primarily because of the removal of 
capital controls but because of closer integration of national capital markets. 
Ronald McKinnon argued that, although capital controls were a way of insu- 
lating national monetary policies, the Eurocurrency markets developed as a 
way of circumventing the controls. He cited a study by Bayoumi that, follow- 
ing the Feldstein-Horioki approach, found that, while aggregate saving and 
investment were more closely balanced under Bretton Woods than under the 
classical gold standard, private saving and investment imbalances were simi- 
lar in the two regimes.’ The reason for the difference between aggregate and 
private behavior was that, under Bretton Woods, government used fiscal pol- 
icy to offset imbalances in the private market. Susan Collins said that one 
lesson of the paper was that capital controls do not work very well-to  make 
them effective, governments have to impose more and more of them. Charles 
Wyplosz viewed capital controls as useful both in maintaining fixed exchange 
rates and in allowing countries to negotiate occasional realignments. He re- 
garded the substantial interest differential that emerged in 1971-73  as an indi- 
cation of when capital controls were useful. They allowed conditions in differ- 
ent parts of the system to diverge as necessary. Controls were in large part 
abandoned in 1973 because the United States and Germany abandoned fixed 
exchange rates. 
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